Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
| |||
|
| |||
| Phenomenology: is the philosophical direction, which goes back to E. Husserl and which assumes that the phenomena of the objects are what is given to us immediately. According to this assumption, these phenomena are the only evident things to us. See also representation, phenomena, perception, certainty, evidence._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
| Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|
|
Hans Heinz Holz on Phenomenology - Dictionary of Arguments
II 89 Bracketing/Husserl/Holz: The assertion of existence is put in brackets. The sole object of phenomenological investigation: the objective content of consciousness. >Existence statement, >Existence, >Ontology. This content already contains the essence of what he meant - wood: that is Cartesian. >Cartesianism. II 100 Ontological difference/thinking/Descartes/Holz: The ontological difference disappears in the thinking of thinking - because the content of consciousness already contains all essential determinateness, without assumption of existence. >Bracketing._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Holz I Hans Heinz Holz Leibniz Frankfurt 1992 Holz II Hans Heinz Holz Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994 |
||
> Counter arguments against Holz
> Counter arguments in relation to Phenomenology
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-27